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The recent discovery of oil and gas in Kenya is an opportunity to establish sound 
policies to support the generation of revenue. For citizens not directly benefiting 
from the oil and gas industry, revenue to the nation will be shared for the benefit of 
all, including future generations. Protecting this revenue throughout the life of the 
finite resource then is a major consideration for policy makers.  
Taxpayers are not always of the same conviction as the Government of the revenue 
they should pay, hence revenue from macroeconomic projections and actual revenue 
collected can vary. Worldwide, disputes arising from oil and gas have resulted in loss 
of revenue to Governments. In addition to revenue forecasting, it is prudent to plan 
for collection through taxpayer compliance management in order to mitigate against 
revenue shortfalls resulting from realised tax compliance risks. Progressive taxation 
planning is an international best practice in oil and gas revenue planning that allows 
policy makers to move to seal loopholes as and when they occur since it is difficult 
to foresee all challenges facing the fiscal regime in oil and gas. This research sought 
to add to knowledge in progressive taxation planning by reviewing Kenya’s oil and 
gas fiscal regime and tax compliance factors for optimised revenue collection.  
Revenue regimes and tax compliance factors in the research were determined by 
studying fiscal regimes and compliance actions in the oil and gas industry in Africa 
from publicised cases that have been determined and concluded in a court of law. 
Fiscal regimes were compared with Kenya’s corresponding fiscal regime and tax 
compliance factors that work in Kenya were deduced from taxpayer compliance 
actions using qualitative content analysis methods.  
It was found that Kenya’s fiscal regime in the oil and gas industry provides for 
collection of tax on Transfer of Interests and Signature Bonus, meaning that the 
fiscal regime was robust enough to facilitate for scenarios of collection of taxes from 
Transfers of Interest and Signature Bonus from oil and gas. However, the fiscal 
regime did not provide for staying proceedings in order to seek arbitration provided 
under Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs), which pointed to an area of possible loss 
of revenue collection through parallel and unrelated processes for tax dispute 
resolution.  
iv 
The factors of tax compliance found to apply in Kenya were deterrence, norms, 
opportunity for evasion, fairness and trust, economic and financial factors and 
industry practice. It was deduced that a taxpayer in the oil and gas industry: unlike 
other industries, has favourable and robust options in dispute resolution processes; 
may want to avoid prolonged disputes; and can enjoy protection under the PSCs that 
fiscal regimes are not enforceable when they default.  
Overall, the taxpayers in the oil and gas industry showed preference for functioning 
PSCs that provided for the demands of the industry; clearly defined fiscal regimes 
and incentives; mitigation of issues that can result in reputational risks, 
disadvantages to the business and financial losses; and a good-natured working 
relationship with the Government leaning heavily on legal compliance. PSCs were 
found to be strong tax compliance instruments leveraged by International Oil 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Background of the Study 
High investment is required to carry out oil and gas industry activities and 
International Oil Companies (IOCs) seek ways to carry out exploration, development 
and production activities, through which working capital can be injected into these 
activities. In the case of oil and gas, Joint Venture (JV) investments are sought where 
a company injects working capital into an exploration block in exchange for a share 
of profits from production (Tordo, 2007). The high cost of investment in the oil and 
gas industry means that companies that participate in the oil and gas industry 
appreciate the high risk and high returns models. They also prefer to work in 
countries where economic policy creates a more stable, profitable and predictable 
operating environments (Kemp & Rose, 1984). 
With so much emphasis on returns that maximise profits, Governments also needs to 
ensure that Government shares of profit oil and taxes from the oil and gas industry 
are realised. Simply put, the more the taxpayer profits, the less the Government will 
profit from oil and gas. Fiscal regimes in the oil and gas industry are therefore are a 
balancing act so that taxpayers recoup their costs through investment tax credits and 
depreciation and make a reasonable amount of profit, and the Government (citizenry) 
benefits from its natural resources (Weller & Rao , 2008). 
The balance between profits to the host Government and IOCs is maintained using 
optimal tax theory which applies fiscal regime that ensures that revenue from oil and 
gas allows IOCs to recoup the high costs invested, and retain a fair amount of 
revenue for the Government. This fiscal regime is implemented by applying fiscal 
regimes and in oil and gas, as well as making constant changes to the fiscal regime to 
ensure that the right amount of profits are also allocated to the host Government 
(Daniel, Keen, & McPherson, 2010).  
The fiscal regimes and compliance risk management provide connections between 
revenue projections from economic policies and actual revenue collections. If fiscal 
regimes provide taxpayers with regimes to pay taxes, then revenue collection is 
assured (Gambo, Mas'ud, Nasidi, & Oyewole, 2014). Similarly, if compliance risk is 
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monitored, taxpayers can be guided to tax compliance patterns that ensure that 
revenue is also collected as expected (Stead & Orozco, 2019).  
Changing fiscal regimes in oil and gas have been seen in countries around the world 
that produce oil and gas or mineral resources. This paper has reviewed progressive 
fiscal regimes for Norway and Nigeria for oil and gas and Tanzania for minerals as 
part of the Literature Review. Changing fiscal regimes in an attempt to optimise 
revenue to the Government can result in less revenue as seen in Nigeria from 1971-
1993, delayed revenue as seen in Norway from 1972-1996 or immediate returns of 
increased revenue to mineral resources industries, which is the intended outcome of 
fiscal progressivity of the oil and gas fiscal regime.  
African Governments go a long way in developing local industries like attracting 
investment in their industries. African countries have grappled with the reality of aid 
and foreign direct investments it receives in return for problems of tax evasion and 
exploitation of resources by the same countries and companies from those countries 
(Kar & Feitas, 2012). For the oil and gas industry, due to the high investment 
required in this industry, IOCs are given incentives to invest in exploration and 
production in African countries with little return back to the host Government 
(Moyo, 2009). 
Petroleum exploration has been on-going in Kenya since the 1950s and commercially 
viable petroleum discoveries were made in Lokichar in Turkana in 2012. Significant 
gas discoveries have also been made offshore (Ministry of Petroleum and Mining, 
2019). During the period following the discovery in Turkana, the country 
experienced an increase in exploration activities for oil and gas in the country by 
local and multinational companies as evidenced by the uptake of contract for 
exploration blocks at the State Department of Petroleum. Kenya has now signed 
forty-two PSCs (Ministry of Petroleum and Mining, 2019). The Government has 
progressed oil and gas economic policy with an aim of boosting economic growth. 
Oil and gas now is a driver of Vision 2030 (Government of Kenya, 2010). The 
Government has implemented the National Energy Policy and Petroleum Act 2019 
with Regulations like the Local Content regulations, which ensure inclusion in oil 
and gas economic activities of locals and nationals as labour, product providers and 
service providers. The petroleum fiscal regime to cater for the industry has also been 
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improved and is under constant scrutiny to ensure that revenue from the industry is 
appropriately collected. Revenue legislations such as the Income Tax Act of 2014 
introduced the Ninth Schedule, which specifically provided for mining and oil and 
gas activities (National Assembly, 2014). This holistic approach to economic 
planning and growth are activities that have to be carried out to position the oil and 
gas to propel the economy forward.  
In Kenya, a contract, known and the PSC, details the contractual relationship 
between the Government of Kenya and the JV and the requirements either party will 
meet. The negotiated and agreed upon obligations include fiscal and non-fiscal terms. 
Fiscal terms detail how financial risks and benefits will be shared between oil 
companies and governments, while non-fiscal terms detail how the oil and gas oil 
and gas industry will be governed and managed for efficient and effective operations 
(Tordo, 2007). Key fiscal terms are defined by: bonus, royalties, income tax, windfall 
profits tax, oil rents, government equity, other taxes and fees, production sharing, 
transfer pricing, debt-to-equity ratio, ring-fencing, loss carry-forward and 
stabilization clauses (Tordo, 2007). Non-fiscal terms are defined but are not limited 
to accelerated capital cost allowances, depletion allowances, investment credits and 
tax holidays (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2010). An example of the use 
of fiscal and non-fiscal terms is how costs will be approved by the Government and 
recouped by the IOC (JV) and how profits will be shared between the IOC (JV) and 
the Government.  
Activities in the oil and gas industry all occur in the context of Kenya’s political 
economy in which citizens have high expectations of improved livelihoods. Other 
issues  facing oil and gas include IOCs seek to maximise profit; global business and 
the tax issues arising from cross border transactions; and the fact that the resource is 
finite and will be depleted after a period of exploitation (Botlhole, Asafu-Adjaye, & 
Carmignani, 2014). Countries must practice prudent tax policy planning in order to 
make sustainable gain from resource wealth as Governments gets better returns 
(profits) and collects a fair share of tax from economic activity from the industry 
(Daniel, Keen, & McPherson, 2010). This calls for the need for a suitable fiscal 
regime.  
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In anticipation of large inflows of revenue from oil and gas, this paper reviewed 
Kenya’s oil and gas fiscal regime and tax compliance factors. This was done by 
comparing Kenya’s oil and gas fiscal regime with information drawn from case 
studies in other countries in Africa. 
 
1.2. Problem Statement 
Optimal taxation is more critical in oil and gas than other industries since the 
resources are of high value and are limited i.e. are depleted after a period (Daniel, 
Keen, & McPherson, 2010). Although much effort is put into optimal taxation, as 
evidenced by the various methodologies that have been developed to monitor 
production (IMF, 2019), revenue loss can occur at the point where it is collected 
through the IOCs recovering costs, transfer pricing, failing to declare value-added 
transactions that have taken place on- or off-shore, among other harmful practices 
(Luca & Puyo, 2016). Failure to plan for collection of the right amount of revenue 
from oil and gas will be regretted at the end of the production period, since there will 
be nothing tangible in the economy to show for those depleted resources, and nothing 
to carry forward for the future generations (Barnett & Ossowski, 2003).  
Similarly, compliance monitoring in Government agencies responsible for revenue 
follows standard or generic compliance monitoring standards based on compliance 
risks (Coglianese, 2012), which may not be suitable in collecting optimal revenue 
from the oil and gas industry.  
The high revenue, finite oil and gas resources, disadvantage that African countries 
have faced when exploiting their natural resources and modest or generic tax 
compliance framework by Governments involved in the oil and gas industry call for 
research to strengthen the fiscal regime and tax compliance framework for optimised 
revenue collection. The type of optimal taxation which anticipates problems that 
hinder collection of the appropriate amount of revenue is an international best 
practice used for fiscal regime planning in the oil and gas industry also known as 
progressive fiscal systems. It allows changes to be made when revenue collection is 
not consistent with projections because of unanticipated gaps in the fiscal regime 
(Daniel, Keen, & McPherson, 2010). 
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A shift in generic fiscal regimes and compliance monitoring is required in order to 
optimise revenue from the oil and gas industry (Luca & Puyo, 2016). This paper 
reviews fiscal regimes and compliance factors that will result in revenue optimisation 
in the oil and gas industry in Kenya.  
  
1.3. Research Objectives  
The overall objective of the paper was to review the Kenya oil and gas fiscal regime 
and factors of compliance for optimised revenue collection. The specific objectives 
were to: 
i. Identify tax instruments and taxpayers’ compliance actions in all the publicly 
available oil and gas industry court cases in Africa. 
ii. Compare identified tax instruments with the corresponding Kenyan oil and 
gas fiscal regime for provisions for the tax instruments. 
iii. Deduce factors affecting tax compliance in Kenya’s oil and gas industry from 
the taxpayers’ compliance actions. 
 
1.4. Research Questions or Hypothesis  
i. What are the tax instruments and taxpayers’ compliance actions in all the 
publicly available oil and gas industry court cases in Africa?  
ii. Does Kenya’s oil and gas fiscal regime provide for the tax instruments found 
in court cases from other countries in Africa? 
iii. From oil and gas industry taxpayers’ compliance actions in Africa, what are 
the factors affecting tax compliance in the oil and gas industry in Kenya?  
 
1.5. Scope of the Study  
This research reviewed Kenya’s oil and gas the fiscal regime to ensure timely, sound 
and appropriate for collection of revenue by checking for tax compliance. It collected 
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and reviewed information of taxpayer compliance and comparisons for Kenya’s 
regime. 
It did not study the political economy of oil and gas and macro-economic planning 
and projections for oil and gas activities, which are pre-requisites to formulation of 
the fiscal regime. The research did not study the soundness of legal arguments in the 
case studies but only drew from information that was used to check fiscal regimes 
and make inferences on taxpayer compliance behaviour. It also did not study cases 
arising from the complex sub-contractual agreements that are common in the 
industry, which introduced dynamics of taxpayer compliance that will need to be 
subjected to further study.  
 
1.6. Significance of the Study 
This research provides tax policy makers with knowledge on whether the fiscal 
regime is timely, sound and appropriate for collection of revenue in the oil and gas 
industry in Kenya. Fiscal regimes and compliance monitoring follow legally 
entrenched and pre-determined or standardized policies based on compliance risk 
factors.  
County Governments in Kenya will also gain better understanding of the operations 
of IOCs in their counties and provide better support to fiscal regimes and compliance 
monitoring frameworks. With the current changing business environment from local 
operations to global business transactions, changes in fiscal regimes and compliance 
monitoring yield higher compliance by corporations and individuals in counties and 
ensure that higher returns in revenue. 
IOCs can benefit from the research by getting deeper insights of Government set 
fiscal regimes and compliance monitoring. This will result in better interaction 
between the Kenya Government and IOCs.  
Tax compliance monitoring for the oil and gas industry can be improved in Kenya 
Revenue Authority and other African revenue collection agencies by monitoring 
fiscal regimes and specified taxpayer compliance factors. This study resulted in 
known tax compliance trends of IOCs involved in the oil and gas industry in Kenya. 
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It is possible for Government agencies that collect revenue to provide fiscal regimes 
and compliance monitoring from a deeper understanding taxpayers’ compliance 
patterns. This is expected to yield higher revenue from oil and gas.  
This dissertation is also available for reference by academic researchers at the 
Strathmore University’s database.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This Chapter reviews academic literature on the theoretical framework for the fiscal 
regime of oil and gas companies’ including a comparison of the output of fiscal 
regimes showing revenue from oil rents in sub-Saharan Africa and Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.  
Different aspects of Fiscal planning in other countries like Norway, Tanzania, 
Nigeria and Kenya are used to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of oil and gas 
fiscal regime.   
 
2.1. Economic Policy for the Oil and Gas Industry  
The former Managing Director at the IMF once remarked, “There are few areas of 
economic policy making which the returns to good decisions are so high - and the 
punishment of bad decisions so cruel - as in the management of resource wealth.” 
(Daniel, Keen, & McPherson, 2010).  
Oil and gas is a distinctive industry which poses special challenges to 
macroeconomic policy, but whose returns promise change for the better to 
livelihoods of masses, directly or indirectly. For this reason, economic policy in 
resource rich countries should be well appraised of: (i) the impact of non-resource 
economic sectors; (ii) budget stabilization to absorb volatile commodity prices of 
natural resources; (iii) fair sharing of benefits of resource wealth across the people of 
the nations and its generations; and (iv) transparent and accountable governance 
structures for the financial flows that arise from natural resource wealth (Daniel, 
Keen, & McPherson, 2010). Barnett & Ossowski give guidelines on how fiscal 
regime design and evaluation should focus on the wider government fiscal regime as 
opposed to focus on oil revenue to ensure that governments remain economically 
strong in spite of fluctuations that occur because of oil revenue (2003).  
It can be understood from this argument that from a high-level perspective, attention 
should not be on oil and gas revenue because of how it affects economic stability, but 
overall economic policy should focus on non-oil revenue. However, the fiscal policy 
for oil and gas is important because some countries rely on its revenue to boost the 
9 
economy (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2001). For example, 
hydrocarbons contribute up to 70% of revenue in countries like Yemen and Algeria 
(Daniel, Keen, & McPherson, 2010). Revenue from natural resources can therefore 
not take a back burner in economic planning and policy formulation, although it is 
advised that it should not be central to Government macroeconomic policy in order 
to avoid challenges like the Dutch Disease as experienced in other countries.  
This argument that non-oil revenue are best not used to fund the economy because it 
promotes economic stability does not favour African countries, which make use of 
revenue from oil and gas activities in the economy more than developed countries. 
According to World Bank statistics, non-high income countries are yet to implement 
a fiscal regime that stabilises revenue from oil and gas. Generally, oil rents as a 
percentage of GDP fluctuate far more in sub-Saharan African states than in more 
developed European (EU) or OECD states (The World Bank, 2019).  
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Even in more developed nations, fluctuations in oil rents as a percentage of GDP in 
the 1970s to 2017 illustrate that oil and gas revenue varied from time to time as 
Governments sought to best benefit from oil and gas as shown in Fig. 1 (The World 
Bank, 2019). Countries like the United States of America (USA) and Angola have 
the highest contributions from oil rents and this revenue fluctuates greatly as a 
percentage of GDP. Regional blocks like the Middle East and countries like Nigeria 
and Venezuela have moderately fluctuating oil rents as a percentage of GDP. 
Norway and the OECD block have relatively smooth fluctuations in oil rents.  
It can be seen that especially in non-high income countries, except USA, oil rents as 
a percentage of fluctuate greatly. It is more likely that the oil is the cause of the 
fluctuation more than GDP.  
Regardless of fluctuation, this revenue has always been and will continue to be 
collected as long as the resource is available. It therefore needs planning for revenue 
optimisation. This means that optimal taxation applies in oil and gas as its revenue in 
African countries is used directly to finance development, bridge budget deficits and 
provide public services (Botlhole, Asafu-Adjaye, & Carmignani, 2014).  
 
2.2. Applying the Theory of Optimal Taxation in the Oil and Gas Industry  
Having determined that the general direction of economic policy on the oil and gas 
industry in developing countries is to collect revenue and use it for the national 
budget and development, fiscal regime therefore needs to be determined and applied, 
in order to achieve optimal taxation.  
Optimal tax theory in the oil and gas industry is the design and implementation of 
taxation in order to maximise collective welfare, without unfairly distorting the 
behaviour of IOCs and other participants in the industry (Mankiw, Weinzierl, & 
Yagan, 2009). In the oil and gas industry, since various sources of revenue are in 
place, optimisation of this revenue should be well thought out. It therefore is an 
important role of Government to implement fiscal regimes that are collectible and at 
the same time, proportionate to IOCs. Revenue to the Government from the oil and 
gas industry include revenue from taxes and revenue from other non-tax instruments, 
11 
which are specific to the oil and gas industry. For instance, IOCs will pay income 
taxes, capital taxes or commodity taxes, depending on the obligations it has 
negotiated with the host Government. This also includes peculiar taxes like resource 
rents which are charged on super profits an IOC can make as a result of high oil 
selling prices or high production. They will also pay to acquire exploration and 
production contracts, acquire ownership in a JV or access the land on which the oil 
blocks lie  (Luca & Puyo, 2016).  
In oil and gas, optimisation of revenue therefore balances delicately between 
attracting investors by reducing their excess burden, and generating revenue to fund 
Government expenditure on public goods and services. Tax policies in the oil and 
gas industry are designed to collect taxes and revenue from the different types of 
revenue. The fiscal regime therefore is the collective legislations, regulations and 
agreements through which Kenya governs economic benefits derived from petroleum 
exploration and production. The difference between tax policy and the petroleum 
fiscal regime therefore lies in the fact that the tax policy limits its rules to collection 
through taxes, and a petroleum fiscal regime collects revenue through tax and non-
tax revenue. In Kenya, revenue and taxes from the oil and gas industry are collected 
by KRA (National Assembly, 2019). With that understanding, the IOCs in this 
research were referred to as taxpayers for all the types revenue remitted to KRA and 
the term revenue was used interchangeably with tax.  
Progressive improvement of fiscal regimes is therefore important for developing 
countries since taxation is an instrument for wealth redistribution (Huesca Reynoso 
& Araar, 2016). The constant change in a fiscal regime is described as the fiscal 
progressivity of an oil and gas fiscal regime, which makes it necessary for 
Governments to constantly review economic policy in oil and gas to ensure that it 
collects the right amount of revenue is collected. This means that these variable 
economic policies cascade down to equally varying fiscal and monetary policy in oil 
and gas (Luca & Puyo, 2016).  
The petroleum fiscal regime will be reviewed and tax compliance factors will be 
identified in line with the theory of optimal taxation, in an effort to determine 
revenue collection in the oil and gas industry.  
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2.3. Oil and Gas Fiscal Regimes in Different Countries  
Loss of revenue can seem to be greater in the petroleum sector due to the amounts 
and different streams of revenue (Kar & Feitas, Illicit Financial Flows from 
Developing Countries: 2001-2010, 2012). As an example, it has been reported that 
Africa relies on the extractives sector to power economies with countries like Nigeria 
relying on oil to fund 75% of its government revenue and Zambia’s copper that 
contributed 73% of total exports in 2015. During this period, exports from African 
countries were comprised of 67% extractives, 50% of which was petroleum. Illicit 
financial flows from Africa represented more than $1 trillion in the last fifty years 
(Kar & Leblanc, 2013). 
Countries such as Norway are successful in managing natural resources revenue and 
have been used as benchmarks to compare performance of the oil and gas sector in 
other countries (Holden, 2013). Norway is said to have established institutions early 
on in oil and gas development and have a stable democracy that limited political 
interference in economic decision making. This institutional alignment made way for 
appropriate channelling of policy direction in fiscal and monetary policy (Thurbera, 
Hultsa, & Hellerb, 2011). Fiscal regimes were applied accompanied by fiscal and 
monetary policies that ensured that oil and gas revenue was diverted to sovereign 
wealth funds.  
Norway’s fiscal regime includes use of tax rates and non-tax factors to optimise 
revenue. The state owned oil company which is directly involved in oil and gas 
production was formed in 1972 and owned 100% by the Government, was privatised 
and listed in New York and Oslo Stock Exchanges in 2001 with a second offering in 
2004 and a merger in 2007. The Government currently owns 67% of Statoil (Liu, 
2016). This means that the Government not only get taxes and the Government’s 
share of profit oil from the production and sale of oil and gas, it also gains a larger 
amount from cost oil and profit oil since it is directly involved in oil and gas 
activities, as opposed to the Kenyan Government which has a carried interest in the 
industry through PSCs. The result is that Norway has had much more share of 
revenue and a relatively stable, predictable and smooth revenue from oil and gas. Oil 
13 
rent in Norway has gradually increased from 0%-5% in 1972-1996 to between 5%-
10% of GDP from 1996-2014 (The World Bank, 2019). Norway is a good example 
of how a country has optimised revenue by using taxes and non-tax revenue, in this 
case through ownership of the company. In this case, since revenue is going back to 
the country through ownership of what we know as IOC operations, it is less critical 
to monitor tax rates for the purpose of progressivity of the fiscal regime.  
In Africa, the reliance of Nigeria on oil and gas is seen in its exports of 
approximately USD 100 billion of oil and gas annually (Africa Progress Panel, 
2013). The progressivity of the fiscal regime followed the path of adopting JVs in 
1971 and issuing the PSC in 1973 with royalty rate at 0%-16.7%; making the royalty 
regime at 12.5% in 1975; a Corporation Tax ring fencing regime in 1981, increasing 
PRT to 45%, 60% and 70% by 1981 and to 75% in 1982; abolishing the royalty 
regime in 1982; reducing PRT to 50% in 1993 (Alade, 2012). These variations of the 
fiscal regime were necessary in order that the Government would get a fair share 
from Nigeria’s oil resources. The resulting revenue to Nigeria as a percentage of 
GDP was 1.6% in 1973, 18.0% in 1975, 1.5% in 1981, 26.4% in 1993 (The World 
Bank, 2019). The regime may not have resulted in consistent increases in revenue for 
various reasons including the fact that it was underpinned by a royalty regime from 
the time it began to 1982 and introduced an income fiscal regime, after which it rose 
steadily from 1.5% of GDP in 1982 to between 15%-25% of GDP in the subsequent 
years to 1993. This illustrates the importance of consistently reviewing the fiscal 
regime until a satisfactory fiscal regime is found. If the fiscal regime in Nigeria had 
remained largely the same of had very small changes, revenue would have been lost, 
even more than was already lost as the Government progressively improved its fiscal 
regime.  
Although Tanzania primarily has more mineral resources than oil and gas, the 
principle of revenue optimisation in another African country is seen through its 
evolving tax rates. In 1997, Tanzanian Government’s share of total benefits was 
significantly less by about 10% of the production share, compared to the share 
collected under the 2004 regime. The 1997 fiscal regime allowed for 100% debt 
financing and 4% royalty rate with 0% equity financing. In 2004, the fiscal regime 
retained the 4% royalty rates and 0% free equity. It also introduced 20% resource 
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rent tax and 15% uplift rates and reduced debt financing to 75% (Daniel, Keen, & 
McPherson, 2010).  
 
Figure 2: Tanzania’s Total Natural Resources Rents a Percentage of GDP  
 
As shown in Figure 2 above, Tanzania’s natural resources rents was 8%-15% before 
1997, 3%-7% of GDP in 1997-2002 and 5%-10% of GDP from 2004 onwards 
(World Bank, 2019). Tanzania has therefore utilized various tax instruments over 
time to optimize returns to the Government, representing a progressive fiscal regime. 
It can be noted however, that the rents dipped after 1997, which can be attributed to 
the fiscal regime in use not being optimal.  
In preparation for revenue from oil and gas, the Government of Kenya has borrowed 
principles that oil revenue should be planned for, collected and disbursed as a distinct 
revenue stream, even as other economic sectors are being monitored (Daniel, Keen, 
& McPherson, 2010). By formulating a specific regime for oil and gas revenue, the 
Government is better able to monitor performance of the fiscal regime.  
 
2.4. Kenya’s Oil and Gas Fiscal Regime  
Before oil discoveries in 2012, Kenya did not have a robust operating environment 
for the sector under the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act of 1985, which 
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Act was enacted into a law in 2019, brought into force a new fiscal regime and 
introducing the new Model PSCs (National Assembly, 2019).  
Kenya’s PSC has evolved including more tax provisions in the Model PSC (Ministry 
of Petroleum and Mining, 2016). Under the Income Tax Act 2014 and VAT Act, 
IOCs are expected to pay CIT, WHIT and VAT. Detailed tax treatment of companies 
in the upstream sector are specified in a separate schedule in the Income Tax Act i.e. 
the Ninth Schedule. Provisions for taxation of direct or indirect Transfer of Interest 
and Hedging were introduced. Provisions on how capital expenditure deductions, 
ring fencing and allowable expenses would be treated for tax purposes are also 
clearly stated (National Assembly, 2014).  
Kenya is not producing oil and gas, therefore its fiscal regime is not in full use and 
can’t be reviewed for optimised revenue collection from IOCs, and it only anticipates 
that it will be effective. The fiscal regime can be reviewed by comparing it to fiscal 
regimes in countries that are in production that have similar challenges. With 
strengthened fiscal regimes and tax compliance monitoring, Kenya’s is able to 
optimise revenue from the oil and gas industry. Best practice however, calls for 
constantly reviewing and amending the fiscal regime in oil and gas in order for 
Governments to gain from the industry (Barnett & Ossowski, 2003). It therefore is 
prudent to anticipate challenges that an oil and gas fiscal regime can encounter and 
provide against such risks.  
 
2.5. Tax Compliance and its Factors 
Public policy evaluation is an important part of Government since it seeks to 
establish how well regulations and regulatory policies work. Regulatory 
administration, behavioural compliance and outcome performance are ways in which 
policy effectiveness and efficiency can be measured (Coglianese, 2012). Compliance 
with tax requirements provides a good measure of the effectiveness of an optimal tax 
policy.  
Behavioural economics studies have proved that decision making by human being 
follows predictable patterns and that man is bound to stumble from rational decisions 
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for various reason (Ariely, 2010). Lobel and Amir assert that gaps arising from 
human missteps can be resolved by laws and policies from insight into behavioural 
economics (2009). This signifies a new perspective in the implementation of 
optimised taxation that was more contentious and adversarial between a taxpayer and 
the agency in charge of revenue collection.  
OECD suggests that tax compliance monitoring can use a model of assuming 
taxpayers are rational and make right decisions when it comes to paying taxes, 
combined with nudges from the responsible agency in order to foster tax compliance 
(OECD, 2013). OECD gives factors that contribute to tax compliance in an analysis 
of taxpayer behavior. They are (i) deterrence such as fear of detections and audits; 
(ii) norms which cause parties to conform to group mentality; (iii) opportunity for 
evasion; (iv) fairness and trust as perceived by different parties; (v) economic factors 
such as tax rates; (vi) financial factors such as incentives; and (vii) industry practice 
in which parties act in ways that are standard to industry or profession (2006). It is 
possible to interpolate and customize these compliance factors to other taxpayer 
categories (2013).  
Kenya has changed its tax compliance policies in line with more developed 
countries’ policies, to more facilitative approaches preceding enforcement 
approaches. KRA has embarked on an initiative that seeks to improve its delivery of 
services to taxpayers based on a more trusting and facilitative approach and 
relationship to improve voluntary compliance among its taxpayers (Kenya Revenue 
Authority, 2015). This is as opposed to a more tax compliance model based on the 
force of the law and the power to enforce tax laws in order for taxpayers to comply 
with tax requirements, also known as enforced compliance. This means giving 
taxpayers an opportunity to comply by working with them to ensure that they meet 
their tax requirements, as opposed to giving guidelines and monitoring for those who 
do not comply in order to enforce tax laws (Wahl, Hoelzl, & Kirchler, 2008). This 
tax compliance policy has to be tried to ensure that revenue loss does not occur. One 
of the ways is to review taxpayer compliance patterns and to design fiscal regime in 
line with those compliance patterns (Manhire, 2015).  
Tax revenue represents less than a third of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa is low 
compared to OECD countries where tax revenue accounts for a third of GDP 
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(Gambo, Mas'ud, Nasidi, & Oyewole, 2014). This is an indicator of lower tax 
compliance in African countries. However, OECD have attempted to illustrate tax 
morale or the willingness of business taxpayers to comply with taxes. From the 
illustration below, tax morale in Africa is higher for businesses compared to other 
regions in the world (Stead & Orozco, 2019).   
 
Tax Morale in Businesses 
 
Figure 3: Tax Morale of Businesses  
 
This represents a contrast to low tax revenue as a percentage of GDP in sub-Saharan 
Africa where figures are generally below 20% (Gambo, Mas'ud, Nasidi, & Oyewole, 
2014). This points to the fact that tax revenue, even if collected in sub-Saharan 
Africa through compliance mechanisms, are not high. That in itself brings to 
questions if revenue is being lost through other means that have not been detected 
such as illicit financial flows, in which the oil and gas industry in Africa contributes 
(Kar & Leblanc, 2013). Studying fiscal regimes and tax compliance can shed light 
into trends in tax revenue in Africa.  
Fiscal regimes are measures of an optimised fiscal regime and of how well the tax 
administration can collect revenue, while tax compliance is a measure of how well 
the tax administration can depend on a taxpayer to declare, file and pay taxes 
correctly (Manhire, 2015). It therefore is possible to study revenue collection by 
reviewing fiscal regime performance and taxpayer compliance indicators.  
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2.6. Summary and Knowledge Gap  
Kenya, like other resource rich countries in Africa, has an opportunity of great 
economic development potential in the oil and gas industry. Revenue from oil and 
gas is utilized in the local economies in African countries in spite of the shocks it 
causes because of price volatility. Worldwide, countries are continually reviewing 
fiscal regimes in oil and gas in order to optimise revenue collection. An appropriate 
fiscal regime will achieve the economic development that oil and gas activities can 
bring Kenya. It is possible to review fiscal regimes by studying reactions to them in 
other jurisdictions that are already using the policies.  
This study, therefore, provides insight that will gradually improve fiscal regimes in 
the oil and gas industry i.e. towards building a progressive fiscal regime in the oil 
and gas industry expected to result in increased revenue collection from the oil and 
gas industry in Kenya.  
 
2.7. Analytical Framework 
This research uses case studies and the reasoning that an experience that has occurred 
in one jurisdiction can be used to improve on a fiscal regime in a country that is 
developing a regime. The independent variable is the fiscal regime that is already in 
use that is being used to mirror advantages i.e. fiscal regimes in African countries. 
The dependent variables are the fiscal regimes in the country developing its regime 
i.e. Kenya. The theoretical basis for the fiscal regimes and factors of compliance 
used are discussed in the Literature Review.  
Court rulings are used to moderate between the variables. They give an indication of 
how a fiscal regime should be treated i.e. fiscal regime is beneficial to Government 




Figure 4: Analytical Framework of Taxpayer Compliance to the Fiscal regime in the Oil and Gas 
Industry 
The analytical framework is as follows: 
The International Oil Companies 
IOCs operate using the same company policies in the different countries they operate 
in. IOC working with fiscal regimes in other African countries provide information 
on the fiscal regime in Kenya and the tax compliance factors.  
 
Africa’s Oil and Gas Producing Countries Fiscal regimes and Taxpayer 
Compliance Actions   
These are the fiscal regime and tax compliance actions in the oil and gas industry that 
are being implemented in other African countries.  
Court judgments from African oil and gas producing countries are used to elicit the 
fiscal regime including the following fiscal and non-fiscal terms: accelerated capital 
International Oil Companies 
(participating in Africa) 
Africa's Oil and Gas 
Producing Countries 
i) Fiscal regimes 




Kenya's Oil and Gas Industry
i) Fiscal regime provisions 
ii) Tax compliance factors
(optimised revenue collection)
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cost allowances, depletion allowances, investment credits, tax holidays, bonus, 
royalties, income tax, windfall profits tax, oil rents, government equity, other taxes 
and fees, production sharing, transfer pricing, debt-to-equity ratio, ring-fencing, loss 
carry-forward and stabilization (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2010; 
Tordo, 2007).  
Court judgments from African oil and gas producing countries are also used to 
moderate between the outcomes of fiscal regimes and how they are applied in 
corresponding Kenyan fiscal regimes. For instance, a judgement can require an IOC 
to pay taxes for oil rents, and indicate why it is payable. The Kenyan fiscal regime 
will check for provisions requiring the taxpayer to pay and tax compliance factors 
will be derived from the taxpayer not paying for the specified reasons.  
 
Kenya’s Oil and Gas Industry Fiscal regimes and Taxpayer Compliance Factors    
Fiscal regimes in Kenya that will be compared can include the following fiscal terms: 
accelerated capital cost allowances, depletion allowances, investment credits, tax 
holidays, bonus, royalties, income tax, windfall profits tax, oil rents, government 
equity, other taxes and fees, production sharing, transfer pricing, debt-to-equity ratio, 
ring-fencing, loss carry-forward and stabilization (Natural Resource Governance 
Institute, 2010; Tordo, 2007). 
The factors of compliance in Kenya for optimised revenue collection that could be 
deduced are: deterrence; norms; opportunity for evasion; fairness and trust; economic 
factors; financial factors such as incentives; and industry practice (OECD, 2013).
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Research Design 
This research aims to review Kenya’s oil and gas fiscal regime and identify tax 
compliance factors for optimised revenue collection. The unit of analysis was 
publicly available and concluded oil and gas court cases in Africa, IOCs.  
The study was based on constructivism philosophy, as it elicited descriptions of 
fiscal regimes and taxpayer compliance actions from court case studies in the oil and 
gas industry from other African countries (Creswell, 2014).  
The research made use of secondary and qualitative data from an electronic data 
source. The research method of qualitative content analysis using deductive 
categorisation was used to collect and analyse information. Deductive categorisation 
connected the qualitative data generated in the research to predetermined theory on 
optimal fiscal regimes and fiscal progressivity (Yin, 2014). Propositions referred in 
this research to as key words have been defined from expert theory discussed in the 
literature review. Key words identified from Natural Resource Governance Institute 
(2010), Tordo (2007) and OECD (2013) theory were used to search for relevant 
information from the cases and analyse the information by comparing to Kenya’s 
fiscal regime in order to review revenue collection and factors of tax compliance. 
 
3.1.1. Method of Review of Fiscal Regimes and Tax Compliance Factors  
In studying the success of the Norwegian model in oil and gas revenue 
administration, Doric & Dimovski assert that other countries involved in the oil and 
gas industry can be assessed against the Norwegian model using success factors they 
identified. These ensure the oil and gas sector is able to sustain growth and generate 
wealth, which also is an output of a sound fiscal regime (2018). This research 
proposes that success factors that work in jurisdictions are comparable to other 
jurisdictions and can used to compare if the fiscal regime design is appropriate.  
Countries have strictly enforced fiscal regimes entrenched in the Constitution 
requiring that a tax or levy must be enforced through a legislation. In a study on the 
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background of taxation in Kenya, Warris shows concern that Kenya has not 
developed a taxation system based on sound taxation principles, but rather has 
maintained colonial taxation perspectives that had no guidelines, rules or 
internationally accepted principles (2007). Although Kenya lacks an overall policy 
that governs proper working of taxation based on principles, the oil and gas fiscal 
regime is captured in the Income Tax Act, Ninth Schedule. In this context, reviewing 
the fiscal regime can be done by reviewing compliance with tax law by collecting 
information on taxpayer behavioural patterns to make inferences on tax compliance. .  
Learning institutional best practices using case studies, like court cases, presents 
useful exploratory tools of simulating how real life circumstances apply in business, 
law and policy (Crowe, et al., 2011) and can be used to uncover patterns, determine 
meanings, construct conclusions and build theory (Patton & Appelbaum, 2003). In 
this research, data drawn from court case studies in the oil and gas industry from 
other African countries was used to review the fiscal regimes and factors of tax 
compliance in Kenya.  
Similarly, oil and gas industry legal disputes are complex and costly and the industry 
generally observes high levels confidentiality (McManus, 2013). The researcher 
anticipated shortage in information on taxpayers in Africa and this also informed 
selecting case studies as the method of research, since a small sample could be used 
to make a reliable inference on tax risk and tax compliance (Crowe, et al., 2011). 
The research reviewed court case studies of the oil and gas industry in Africa to 
analyse taxpayer actions for tax compliance and compare to Kenya’s fiscal regime. 
The reason for using court case studies in the research was they provided a source of 
data on taxpayer compliance actions that was publicly available, could be collected 
and reviewed for tax compliance. Tax compliance behaviour that has occurred in the 
African continent was comparable to Kenya since common challenges in oil and gas 
revenue mobilisation have occurred in Africa which have resulted in loss of revenue 
legally through aggressive tax planning and through illicit financial flows (Kar & 
Leblanc, 2013). 
A search engine in the SAFLII database was used to identify the population and 
select the sample that would be used as case studies. SAFLII was selected, as it is the 
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only institutionalized legal information database focused on Africa. SAFLII has 
relevant legal information from sixteen African countries: Angola, Botswana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
3.2. Population and Sampling 
This research reviewed one hundred per cent of SAFLII tax case studies from the oil 
and gas industry in other African jurisdictions. The information was extracted from 
the database and cross-referenced as explained in the data collection procedures 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009).  
The population was comprised of cases going back as far as records are available. 
IOCs operate global enterprises in high entry barrier economic sectors. It is expected 
that the same companies practice the same policies in different jurisdictions. In 
addition, taxpayer compliance behaviour can be built over a long period of time 
(Manhire, 2015).  
Sampling was done by selecting those cases where the contractual instruments used 
between Governments and the IOCs are similar to that in Kenya, which is a PSC 
(Creswell, 2014).  
 
3.3. Data Collection  
On a networked laptop, in the SAFLII database and using the SAFLII search engine, 
the following criteria was used to search for data on: (i) “oil and gas” using “any of 
these terms” search option in “all databases”; and (ii) “tax or fiscal or revenue” using 
a “Boolean search” option in “all databases”. Search criteria of “any of these terms” 
looks for data that has either oil or gas and populates the results. A Boolean search 
looks for data relevant to all words separated by “or” and populates the results. These 
searches ensured that all results with the words “oil”, “gas”, “fiscal”, “tax” or 
“revenue” were in the results. Since the research represents two knowledge areas, i.e. 
taxation and oil and gas, two separate searches were done to get homogenous data. 
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This avoided losing relevant information, which could happen if broader or generic 
searches are, used (Yin, 2014).  
To get the population of fiscal regime cases relevant to the oil and gas industry, these 
two datasets were copied to MS Excel and cross-referenced using VLOOKUP 
function. Results from the oil and gas search criteria were cross-referenced with 
results from the tax or fiscal or revenue search criteria, and vice versa. This was done 
to narrow in on cases from the oil and gas industry that focus on fiscal regimes. Data 
cleaning was done to remove information that is not relevant to the research that 
comes up under the two searches like legislations and journal articles relevant to the 
search topics. Duplicated cases were also identified using Highlight Duplicates 
function in MS Excel.  
Cases that emerged from cross-referenced searches formed the population. Detailed 
case study information on the population was extracted from the SAFLII database 
and copied in the Checklist in Appendix 1. The extracted information was scanned 
for tax instruments using searches for the keywords of fiscal and non-fiscal terms 
(Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2010; Tordo, 2007). The country and type 
of production agreement between the country and the taxpayer were also identified. 
Country of the case, parties, tax instrument and type of agreement were recorded in 
the Checklist in Appendix 1. The keywords included other fiscal regimes, which are 
grouped in some terms e.g. corporation tax and capital gains are income taxes. 
Samples were then selected from cases that have similar contract agreements as 
Kenya i.e. the PSC, since they were comparable with Kenya’s fiscal regime. Samples 
were recorded in the template in Appendix 2 according to the tax instrument that was 
being disputed. They were numbered according to Case Study One, Two, and so on. 
Shortened sections of the judgments and taxpayers compliance actions were recorded 
in the template in Appendix 2. Only data relevant to the fiscal regime and the 
taxpayer’s compliance actions was recorded. For focus on fiscal regimes and 
compliance and not on the actual court proceedings, the parties in the case studies 
were referred to as taxpayer for the party from who payment was expected and 
Government for the party responsible for collection of revenue. IOCs participating in 
the case were referred to as Taxpayer A in Case Study One, B in Two, and so on. 
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Taxpayers were also anonymised according to SAFLII’s General Principles on 
Terms of Use on privacy in Appendix 4.  
The corresponding Kenyan legislation to be searched for fiscal regime provisions 
was identified by the legislation quoted in the case studies. They included but were 
not limited to East Africa Community Customs Management Act, VAT Act, Income 
Tax Act and the PSC. A search of the Kenyan legislation using keywords by Natural 
Resource Governance Institute and (2010) and Tordo (2007) identified provisions in 
Kenyan legislation. These provisions were recorded in the Table in Appendix 2 for 
comparative analysis. 
The data collection process was repeated by a reviewer to check for similarity of 
results.  
 
3.4. Data Analysis  
Comparative analysis was carried out for the fiscal regimes in the case studies and 
that in Kenya. Presence of the provisions in Kenyan fiscal regime indicated 
opportunities for oil and gas revenue collection in the fiscal regime and absence 
indicated a gap.  
In line with deductive categorisation data analysis, the taxpayers’ compliance actions 
were analysed according to theory on factors of tax compliance (2013). Descriptions 
matching the OECD explanations were used to identify which tax compliance factors 
are used by oil and gas industry taxpayers in Africa. Since Africa faces similar 
challenges in oil and gas revenue management, these findings included the 
circumstances Kenya would face when it went into production. 
 
3.5. Research Quality  
The Checklist (Appendix 1) was used to focus the research including who owns oil 
resources, what legal instrument is used and the fiscal regime terms. Only cases that 
had fiscal and fiscal terms were studied. For objectivity, only concluded cases in 
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Africa were included in the study and the research relied purely on external, 
secondary and publicly available data sources, which can be verified. Value 
judgements made by the researcher were guided by defined propositions (key words) 
used by tax theory experts in the areas of fiscal regimes and tax compliance.   
The validity and reliability of research findings was secured by analysing publicly 
available judgements made by the judge/arbitrator and not subjecting the 
comparative study to judgements in one country only, but analysing cases from other 
countries in Africa. This is an adequate control since the judgments are made within 
the confines of law, regardless of the jurisdiction or participants in the case. It is 
assumed that the judge issued fair judgements according to the law in the cases 
analysed. An independent reviewer counterchecked cases drawn from databases for 
errors of data entry. The reviewer confirmed the data collected to assure data 
credibility. Fields where there was incomplete or inconsistent data were indicative of 
a non-compliance pattern and were analysed further for impact on tax compliance. 
Where there was match to tax compliance, the sample was discarded.  
The research stuck to known values as much as possible. Outliers were analysed and 
a decision made to retain or discard outliers e.g. contradicting judgements from 
different jurisdictions would be analysed for differences in form or substance.  
 
3.6. Ethical Issues in Research  
This research used secondary data and did not require interviews. It did not contain 
any studies with human or animal subjects performed by any of the participants.  
To safeguard research ethics, ethical approval from the Strathmore University 
Institutional Ethical Review Committee and a permit from the National Commission 
for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) were obtained before 
conducting the research. Ethical issues arising from use of secondary data were 
assured by retrieval and rechecking by an independent investigator. Use of 
information from SAFLII followed the Terms of Use in Appendix 4 and SAFLII was 
acknowledged in the research (Creswell, 2014).   
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Independent review of the data collected was incorporated; investigators signed a 
conflict of interest declaration; data fabrication or misinterpretation was not possible 
by defining the data collection and analysis processes; biases from personal opinions 
were avoided by making inferences from the data; and errors and negligence were 
avoided by proper design of the model and data analysis.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS  
4.1. Data Extraction and Determination of the Population 
Data collection was carried out by searching the SAFLII database and yielded 403 
results for “Oil and Gas” and 12,110 results for “Tax or Fiscal or Revenue” search 
criteria. This data was cleaned to remove legislations and journal articles. After 
cross-referencing and data cleaning, the following was the population:  
i. Taxpayer A Vs Uganda Revenue Authority (Civil Appeal No 14 of 2011) 
UGCOMMC 97 (12 September 2011) 
ii. Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (SOC) Limited v The 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (42716/15) ZAGPPHC 
871 (6 November 2018)   
iii. Taxpayer B v Uganda Revenue Authority (TAT APPLICATION NO 4 OF 
2011) UGTAT 1 (16 June 2014) 
iv. Uganda Revenue Authority v Total Uganda Limited (Civil Appeal No. 08 OF 
2010) UGCOMMC 170 (21 December 2012) 
v. Federal Government of Nigeria and 6 others v. Taxpayer C (SC 268/2001) 
(13 December 2002) 
vi. GE International Operations (Nig) Ltd v Q Oil and Gas Services Limited 
(SC207/2014) NGSC 31 (18 March 2016)  
vii. Abet Inspection Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation 
of South Africa (SOC) Ltd and Another (15599/16) ZAWCHC 39 (8 March 
2017)  
viii. Mthimunye-Bakoro v Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa 
(SOC) Limited and Another (12476/2015) ZAWCHC 113; 2015 (6) SA 338 
(WCC) (4 August 2015)  
ix. Indwe Aviation (Pty) Ltd v Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South 
Africa and Another (A4610/2011, 14366/2010) ZAWCHC 457 (20 
September 2011)  
x. Co-Operative Worker Association and Another v Petroleum Oil & Gas Co-
Operative of SA and Others (C437/2003) [2006] ZALC 83; 1 BLLR 55 (LC) 
(1 September 2006)  
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4.2. Sampling Frame  
The following sampling frame was used to identify the case studies to be subjected to further review. Those cases that used the Production 
Sharing Contract were selected.  
Table 1: Sampling Frame  
  Country  Case Oil Resource 
Ownership

























of 6 November 
2018 
Not an oil and gas 
case. It focuses on 
distribution of 








For The South 
African 
Revenue Service  
N/A - - 
3. Uganda Tax Appeals 
Tribunal 
TAT Application 
No. 4 of 2011 





Capital gains tax 
assessed on a 
transfer of interests 
in blocks in Uganda 
Taxpayer B 
4. Uganda  Civil Appeal No. 




Not an oil and gas 
case. It focuses on 
distribution of 






N/A - - 
5. Nigeria  SC 268/2001 (13 
December 2002) 
 
Government  Federal Govern
ment of Nigeria 
and 6 Others  
Taxpayer C Production 
Sharing Contract 
Signature Bonus 
and reserve value  
Taxpayer C 
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  Country  Case Oil Resource 
Ownership 






6. Nigeria SC207/2014 NGSC 
31 (18 March 2016)  
Not an oil and gas 
case. It focuses on It 
focuses on distribution 





Q Oil and Gas 
Services Limited 




ZAWCHC 39 (8 
March 2017)  
Not an oil and gas 
case. It focuses on It 
focuses on distribution 





Petroleum Oil and 
Gas Corporation 
of South Africa 
(SOC) Ltd and 
Another 





2015 (6) SA 338 
(WCC) (4 August 
2015)  
Not an oil and gas 
case. It focuses on It 
focuses on distribution 




Petroleum Oil and 
Gas Corporation 
of South Africa 
(SOC) Limited 
and Another 





ZAWCHC 457 (20 
September 2011)  
Not an oil and gas 
case. It focuses on It 
focuses on distribution 




Petroleum Oil and 
Gas Corporation 
of South Africa 
and Another 




83; 1 BLLR 55 
(LC) (1 September 
2006)  
Not an oil and gas 
case. It focuses on It 
focuses on distribution 






Petroleum Oil & 
Gas Co-Operative 
of SA and Others 
- - - 
 
In summary, from the population of ten case studies, three cases studies were found on tax disputes in the oil and gas industry in Africa. Two 
were from Uganda and one from Nigeria.  
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The three case study companies were identified in the research as Taxpayer A in Case Study One, Taxpayer B in Case Study Two and Taxpayer 
C in Case Study Three. The population was transferred to Table 1 as shown and the findings for the three case studies were transferred to Table 
2, 3 and 4, where interpretation was done.  
 
4.3. Findings and Interpretation of the Fiscal Regime and Tax Compliance  
Table 2 below has the results to the first research question of tax instruments and taxpayer compliance actions in Africa.  
 
Table 2: Findings of the Tax Instruments and Taxpayer Compliance Actions in Africa  
 Tax Instrument Taxpayer Compliance Actions 
Case Study 1 Objection to 
Capital Gains Tax 
on Transfer of 
Interest  
i. The taxpayer objected to tax assessments for Capital Gains Tax that were made under the authority of the Income Tax 
Act and filed two applications in the Tribunal 
ii. Before hearing of the two applications were finalized, the taxpayer filed Miscellaneous Applications seeking to stay 
the proceedings in those applications and have the matter referred to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration 
clause in the PSA 
iii. When denied a stay of proceedings at the TAT, the taxpayer appealed that the TAT erred in refusing to stay its 
proceedings.   
Case Study 2 Capital Gains Tax 
on Transfer of 
Interest  
i. The taxpayer did not declare income on transfers of interest undertaken, triggering tax assessments from the 
Government Agency  
ii. The taxpayer challenged initial assessments, which were revised, of income tax (being capital gains tax)  
iii. The taxpayer was aggrieved by the assessments and appealed to the Tribunal. 
iv. The taxpayer paid an amount being 30% of the tax assessed. 
Case Study 3 Signature Bonus  i. The taxpayer applied for, succeeded and an oil block was allocated, subject to certain conditions. He would have to pay 
what was referred to as Signature Bonus and reserve value as conditions for allocation of oil blocks.  
ii. The taxpayer paid part of the amount within the required period, but required a grace period of forty five days to pay 
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 Tax Instrument Taxpayer Compliance Actions 
the balance.  
iii. The taxpayer instituted action in the High court, which found that a valid contract existed between the parties.  
iv. It ordered the parties to conclude the contract.  
v. The Government appealed against that decisions to the Court of Appeal but their appeal was dismissed.  
vi. The Government therefore lodged a further appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal was dismissed by a majority 
decision.  
 
The disputed tax instruments were two case studies on Capital Gains Tax on Transfer of Interests and one on Signature Bonus. The summarised 
taxpayer compliance actions in Africa were the taxpayer objected to TAT hearings and prefers for disputed Capital Gains assessments to be heard 
in arbitration; the taxpayer did not declare income on Transfer of Interest and was aggrieved by assessments on it by the Government; and the 
taxpayer did not pay Signature Bonus prior to effecting the contract but wanted to continue to perform the PSC on the exploration block. 
Table 3 below has the results to the second research question of the corresponding Kenyan fiscal regime to the one found in other African 
countries and the interpretation.  
Table 3: Findings and Interpretation of Fiscal Regime Provisions in Kenya   
 Tax Instrument Kenya’s Fiscal Regime Provisions Comparative Interpretation of the Kenya Oil and Gas Fiscal 
Regime 
Case Study 1 Objection to 
Capital Gains Tax 
on Transfer of 
Interest  
The Income Tax Act allows for Determination of 
Objections, Appeals and Relief for Mistakes Under 
Part X of the Income Tax Act Section 86(1). It 
allows taxpayers in the oil and gas industry to 
appeal decisions made relating to taxation of oil and 
gas fiscal terms. As was peculiar to the dispute in 
this case study, the Income Tax (Tribunal) Rules 
however, do not provide for staying hearings in 
The Income Tax allows for determination of disputes related to tax 
instruments in oil and gas. Income Tax (Tribunal) Rules however, do 
not provide for staying hearings in order for PSC or any other dispute 
resolution alternatives to be followed by the parties. The existence of 
two parallel dispute resolution mechanisms in the oil and gas 
industry, i.e. the Tribunal and arbitration, provide opportunities and 
challenges. Preference for international arbitration using United 
Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
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 Tax Instrument Kenya’s Fiscal Regime Provisions Comparative Interpretation of the Kenya Oil and Gas Fiscal 
Regime 
order for PSC or any other dispute resolution 
alternatives to be followed by the parties. 
Arbitration Rules may be an indicator of inefficiencies of local 
dispute resolution instruments. Perhaps cases take too long to be 
heard, since the case mentioned that parties could resort to arbitration 
after sixty days of the dispute, or IOCs may not feel they get a fair 
hearing in tax Tribunals. Without resolution of perceived issues of 
the local Tax Appeals Tribunals in Africa, oil and gas tax disputes 
will be heard in international forums, at risk of revenue and other 
additional cost to the Governments.
Case Study 2 Capital Gains Tax 
on Transfer of 
Interest  
The Income Tax Act provisions on Capital Gains 
Tax are charged according to Section 3 (2) (f) but 
this does not include tax on transfer if petroleum 
interests which is specifically provided for 
separately. Transfer of Interest is brought to charge 
under Section 3(2)(g), Section 3(3) and the Ninth 
Schedule Section 13.  
It was found that the Kenyan fiscal regime specifically provides for a 
separate tax instrument for tax on Transfer of Interest and not just 
Capital Gains tax.  
These provisions were found to be sufficiently clear on bringing tax 
to charge. Unlike the fiscal regime in Uganda that charged transfer of 
interests under Capital Gains tax instrument, Kenya’s regime clearly 
sets the consideration received from transfer of interest as being 
taxable under specific provisions. Clarity in tax legislation defining 
what tax is payable helps to alleviate disputes, which may have been 
the trigger of this dispute. Since the law did not expressly say capital 
gains was payable, the taxpayer in this case study probably did not 
believe that capital gains tax was payable.  
 
Case Study 3 Signature Bonus  The Petroleum Act 2019 states that the contractor 
shall pay to the National Government Signature 
Bonus prior to the award of the petroleum 
agreement in Section 55.  
In this case, in spite of the PSC in Nigeria clearly requiring the 
taxpayer to meet his contractual obligation as a condition for being 
allocated a block, did not stop the taxpayer from failing to pay 
Signature Bonus in time with the court’s indulgence. The difference 
between contract law and tax law is clear here. Tax is payable when it 
becomes due, whereas payments under contract law are enforceable 




In summary, all three tax instruments representing the three fiscal terms in the oil and gas industry in Africa were found to be present in Kenya’s 
oil and gas fiscal regime. However, there were some peculiarities that would make the provisions more difficult to implement. For example, the 
PSC had provisions to settle tax disputes using alternative means but Kenya’s tax law did not provide for staying tax dispute proceedings in order 
to pursue alternative dispute resolution that taxpayers in the oil and gas sector seemed to prefer. 
Table 4 below has the results to the third research question of the factors of tax compliance in Kenya and the interpretation. 
Table 4: Findings and Interpretation of Factors of Tax Compliance in Kenya  
 Taxpayer Compliance Actions Deductive Interpretation of Kenya’s Tax Compliance 
Case Study 1 i. The taxpayer objected to tax assessments for 
Capital Gains Tax that were made under the 
authority of the Income Tax Act and filed two 
applications in the Tribunal 
ii. Before hearing of the two applications were 
finalized, the taxpayer filed Miscellaneous 
Applications seeking to stay the proceedings in 
those applications and have the matter referred to 
arbitration in accordance with the arbitration clause 
in the PSA 
iii. When denied a stay of proceedings at the TAT, the 
taxpayer appealed that the TAT erred in refusing to 
stay its proceedings.   
i. Norms: IOCs rely on the proper functioning of a PSC to protect their business as seen in 
case study one. Norms are clearly defined in and form part of the fiscal regime.  
ii. Fairness and trust: The UN system of arbitration is an international dispute resolution 
system compared to the Tax Appeals Tribunal, which was locally constituted in the 
country the dispute occurred. Although the case study clearly states that UNCITRAL 
processes could be embarked upon after sixty days of a dispute not being resolved, the 
taxpayer always had arbitration as an option should the TAT hearing seem not to go in his 
favour.  
iii. Economic and Financial factors: Defined as motivation for companies to operate such as 
incentives. This may be linked to case study two where the taxpayer failed to declare and 
pay Capital Gains Tax on Transfer of Interest. The taxpayer may have perceived tax on 
transfer of interest as having been excluded in order to attract it to carry out exploration 
and production activities i.e. no tax on transfer of interest as an incentive of doing 
business in that country since favourable tax rates, exemptions and holidays are often used 
to attract investment. 
iv. Industry practice: Defined as parties act in ways that are standard to industry or 
profession. Industry practice features heavily in all case studies, and likely the reason why 
there is a PSC between Government and IOCs to administer work carried out in the 
industry. Overall, it is clear that the industry is highly litigious in order to get 
interpretation of tax and contract law. As seen in case study one, the industry also has its 
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 Taxpayer Compliance Actions Deductive Interpretation of Kenya’s Tax Compliance 
own dispute resolution provisions, separate from tax dispute resolution. In case study 
three, performance of the contract in the industry is perceived as an on-going exercise as 
opposed to taxation that enforces due dates. From case study two, revised assessments of 
taxes occur as a result of the interaction between the IOCs and Government Agency, 
probably because of the back and forth of determining the actual taxable status of 
revenue. It therefore was clear from the beginning how much taxes are payable. 
Case Study 2 i. The taxpayer did not declare income on transfers of 
interest undertaken, triggering tax assessments 
from the Government Agency  
ii. The taxpayer challenged initial assessments, which 
were revised, of income tax (being capital gains 
tax)  
iii. The taxpayer was aggrieved by the assessments and 
appealed to the Tribunal. 
iv. The taxpayer paid an amount being 30% of the tax 
assessed. 
i. Deterrence: The taxpayer is not in fear of audits, but in fear of other enforcement actions 
being undertaken resulting from defaulting on payment. It can be hypothesised that the 
taxpayer did not want to lose his contract area, even though he had not met all obligations 
and communicated before time asking for a grace period to pay. The action shows 
willingness, if given a chance, to move from non-compliance to compliance. If the 
taxpayer remained silent and hoped not to be detected, then he would risk his oil block 
being reallocated without defence of performing the contract.  
ii. Norms: IOCs expect incentives from the Government such as exemption from some taxes, 
as seen in case study two.  
iii. Opportunity for evasion: There was an incident of unwillingness to pay assessed tax 
because the legislation did not clearly stipulate it as being payable. The taxpayer 
perceived that the Income Tax Act did not specify that Capital Gains Tax was payable and 
therefore did not declare or pay tax.  
iv. Fairness and trust: The fact that in case study two the tax legislation was not explicit in 
detailing payable tax may have resulted in an “unfairly treated” attitude from the taxpayer.  
v. Economic and Financial factors: The taxpayer failed to declare and pay Capital Gains Tax 
on Transfer of Interest. The taxpayer may have perceived tax on transfer of interest as 
having been excluded in order to attract this taxpayer to carry out exploration and 
production activities i.e. no tax on transfer of interest as an incentive of doing business in 
that country since favourable tax rates, exemptions and holidays are often used to attract 
investment. 
vi. Industry practice: Revised assessments of taxes occur as a result of the interaction 
between the IOCs and Government Agency, probably because of the back and forth of 
determining the actual taxable status of revenue. It therefore was clear from the beginning 
how much taxes are payable. 
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 Taxpayer Compliance Actions Deductive Interpretation of Kenya’s Tax Compliance 
Case Study 3 i. The taxpayer applied for, succeeded and an oil 
block was allocated, subject to certain conditions. 
He would have to pay what was referred to as 
Signature Bonus and reserve value as conditions 
for allocation of oil blocks.  
ii. The taxpayer paid part of the amount within the 
required period, but required a grace period of forty 
five days to pay the balance.  
iii. The taxpayer instituted action in the High court, 
which found that a valid contract existed between 
the parties.  
iv. It ordered the parties to conclude the contract.  
v. The Government appealed against that decisions to 
the Court of Appeal but their appeal was dismissed. 
vi. The Government therefore lodged a further appeal 
to the Supreme Court. The appeal was dismissed by 
a majority decision.  
i. Deterrence: The taxpayer is not in fear of audits, but in fear of other enforcement actions 
being undertaken resulting from defaulting on payment. It can be hypothesised that the 
taxpayer did not want to lose his contract area, even though he had not met all obligations 
and communicated before time asking for a grace period to pay. The action shows 
willingness, if given a chance, to move from non-compliance to compliance. If the 
taxpayer remained silent and hoped not to be detected, then he would risk his oil block 
being reallocated without defence of performing the contract.  
ii. Norms: The IOC expected incentives from the Government such as exemption from some 
taxes.  
iii. Opportunity for evasion: The taxpayer was granted a reprieve for not pay Signature Bonus 
but still retaining the contract area, in spite of non-payment of the full amount of 
Signature Bonus which was required when his allocation for the contract area was 
approved. Clearly defined fiscal regimes provides opportunities where the taxpayer will or 
will not comply.  
iv. Fairness and trust:  
v. Industry practice: Performance of the contract in the industry is perceived as an on-going 
exercise as opposed to taxation that enforces due dates.  
 
Generally, all the factors of tax compliance from OECD theory were found to be active in the oil and gas industry in one way or another i.e. 
norms, fairness and trust, economic and financial factors, industry practice, deterrence and opportunity for evasion. Based on the illustrations on 
the taxpayers’ actions, it was deduced that a taxpayer in the oil and gas industry: unlike other industries, has favourable and robust options in 
dispute resolution processes; may want to avoid prolonged disputes, hence the preference for international processes that resolve disputes that 
have gone on for six months; will show unwillingness and strong conviction against paying taxes where the tax is not clear; and can enjoy 
protection under the PSC that fiscal regimes are not enforceable when they default. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
The overall objective of the paper was to review the Kenya oil and gas fiscal regime 
and factors of compliance for optimised revenue collection. This research found 
three case studies in Africa that had tax instruments and taxpayer compliance actions. 
The two tax instruments in Africa were Capital Gains on Transfer of Interests and 
Signature Bonus.  
The summarised taxpayer compliance actions in Africa were the taxpayer objected to 
TAT hearings and prefers for disputed Capital Gains assessments to be heard in 
arbitration; the taxpayer did not declare income on Transfer of Interest and was 
aggrieved by assessments on it by the Government; and the taxpayer did not pay 
Signature Bonus prior to effecting the contract but wanted to continue to perform the 
PSC on the exploration block.  
This research points to critical areas the oil and gas industry that the Kenyan 
Government should be aware of and the challenges of administering fiscal regimes in 
the context of PSCs. The promise that the oil and gas industry has in revenue to GoK 
can be realised to satisfaction if the fiscal regime are harmonised with the PSC. This 
research discussed the findings, conclusion and recommendations of the Kenyan 
fiscal regime and the factors of tax compliance in the following paragraphs.  
It also found that of the two disputed tax instruments in the African oil and gas 
industry, Kenya’s fiscal regime had provisions for both of them i.e. tax on Transfer 
of Interests and Signature Bonus. However, it did not provide for hearing of tax 
disputes through arbitration as given in the PSC. Similarly, a challenge was 
identified in case study three in spite of having legislation providing for payment of 
Signature Bonus. The court ruled that the PSC was enforceable even when the 
taxpayer had not paid Signature Bonus in full. Since the fiscal regime was present 
but Signature Bonus was not collectible at the time it was due, it was proven that 
fiscal regimes do not suffice in collection of the right amount of revenue. PSC 
provisions and administrative errors can hinder the collection of revenue even in 
cases where the law provides for collection.  
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The fiscal regime for the oil and gas industry on its own may not be adequate in 
ensuring that the taxpayer complies with revenue requirements under the PSC. 
Administrative measures can hinder enforcement of the fiscal regime. The result is 
losses to Governments that are not empowered to administer the fiscal regime. 
Actions by the GoK have to be procedural to the letter of the law.  
Clarity of tax legislation and of administrative processes is a critical requirement in 
the PSC regime because IOCs require that kind of clarity when making the decisions 
to invest in Kenya. Failure to provide that clarity can lead to the taxpayer being 
aggrieved and protracted disputes, all at high cost or losses to the Government and a 
hindrance to invest further by IOCs. In addition, taxes involved in the industry are 
high and the expense must be planned in the corporate circle. This can only be done 
when tax requirements are well understood.  
Disputes in the oil and gas industry can occur for various reasons including work 
performance in geological technical areas. A dispute resolution clause in the PSC 
allows generally for disputes to be arbitrated separately from the dispute mechanism 
provided for in Kenya’s Income Tax Act. It would be beneficial for rules to be 
clearly set on the functioning of the PSC’s tax dispute resolution. This is because in 
tax objection or appeal cases, GoK revenue is held pending the resolution of tax 
disputes. Allowing alternative dispute resolution processes to occur outside the 
purview of the Income Tax Act can put GoK revenue at risk. 
With respect to compliance factors, they were found to feature strongly in the actions 
of the taxpayers in the three case studies. As found in the analysis, the OECD factors 
of compliance were found to function in African oil and gas industry through 
different ways. They are deterrence, norms, opportunity for evasion, fairness and 
trust, economic and financial factors and industry practice. Since the same companies 
working in the oil and gas industry in different parts of Africa also work in Kenya, 
the factors of compliance from the companies are applicable in Kenya. 
Overall, the taxpayers in the oil and gas industry showed preference for functioning 
PSCs that provided for the demands of the industry; clearly defined fiscal regimes 
and incentives; mitigation of issues that can result in reputational risks, 
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disadvantages to the business and financial losses; and a good-natured working 
relationship with the Government leaning heavily on legal compliance.  
The PSC featured strongly in the tax compliance analysis due to the of taxpayers 
being deeply embedded in the PSC, which means that it is a tool used by the 
taxpayers to manage tax compliance and an area of compliance risk for KRA.  
The oil and gas industry has complex and sophisticated codes of operation, 
introduced through PSCs. Whereas PSCs are useful in contracting parties to works to 
be carried out as part of an exploration or production area, they can provide IOCs 
with advantages that shield them from Government revenue management processes 
as seen in the case where Signature Bonus was payable. Where industry practices 
favouring the oil and gas industry cannot be captured under a fiscal regime, the PSC 
can indirectly provide IOCs with financial or economic benefits as incentives for 
investment. Since the Government’s take from the oil and gas industry is tax revenue 
and profit oil, the IOC may pay normal taxes as prescribed by fiscal regimes and get 
reprieves on profit oil and other fees and levies. PSCs are compliance risks to 
Government revenue, which provide parallel legal channels through which revenue 
can be delayed or withheld. For Governments administering the oil and gas industry 
including Kenya, the challenge was that there could be cases where the PSC and 
revenue management legislations were not aligned, which could result in “gray” 
areas in the fiscal regime or the regime not covering important revenue aspects 
altogether. It is critical for Government of Kenya (GoK) to review the PSC for other 
provisions that would prevent revenue legislations from being implemented. 
Knowledge of the factors of compliance in the oil and gas industry in Kenya can also 
be used to derive suitable fiscal regimes and administrative arrangements to carry the 
regimes. KRA is currently working with “trust through facilitation”. In the oil and 
gas industry, the compliance factor of trust is it is enforced through legality or 
illegality of actions and not goodwill. GoK therefore is able to align its 
administration of the fiscal regime appropriately by ensuring procedures are 
followed. The main factor of compliance of heavy reliance on legal systems in the oil 
and gas industry in order to function properly also means and Governments have to 
invest in legal empowerment in order to function at the level of oil and gas 
companies. For Kenya, this means it is a cost to GoK to build its legal capacity in oil 
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and gas revenue management. It also is a higher cost to GoK not to build its legal 
capacity in oil and gas revenue management because of revenue loss.  
One limitation of the research was that data on fiscal regimes and taxpayer 
compliance actions in Africa was hard to come by. The information relied on the few 
publicised cases in Africa and some of the large oil producers had no publicly 
available information. This limited the findings to the information that was in 
available case studies only. It may have been possible to get more descriptions of 
fiscal regimes and factors of tax compliance. Another limitation was the reliance on 
concluded and public court case studies which could have been affected by 
institutional failures, thereby not depicting the actual explanation of the fiscal regime 
or factors of tax compliance.  
As discussed above, the research is, however, resourceful to policy makers and 
related institutions who are looking for ways to optimise revenue from the oil and 
gas industry by pointing to areas focus on. For example, in this research, the PSC 
was found to be central to Government revenue optimisation in the oil and gas 
industry.  
Further studies in the oil and gas fiscal regime can be carried out in the area of tax 
compliance in Africa and Kenya and more factors and instruments of compliance can 
be identified. Further work can also be carried out in ways to enforce compliance to 
fiscal regimes in the performance of a PSC. In spite of having legal information from 
various African countries, information on disputes is not as easily available as in 
more developed countries. Public information on large oil producing countries like 
Libya, Algeria, Angola, Morocco and other countries would be very beneficial. This 
can be used to profile taxpayers for additional tax compliance monitoring.  
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Appendix 1: Sampling Frame  
  Case Oil resource 
ownership 
Claimant Respondent Legal instrument Fiscal terms disputed 
e.g. Kenya 20125 Government  Company K Commissioner of Tax  PSC  Corporation tax for non-residents not 
payable 
Country A          
…      




Appendix 2: Results of Fiscal Regimes and Compliance Factors 
Tax Instrument Taxpayers’ Compliance 
Actions 
Kenya’s Fiscal regime Provisions Kenya Tax Compliance Factors 
e.g. Corporation Tax The taxpayer paid Corporation 
taxed 
Section B of the Income Tax Act provides for non-resident companies 
to pay Corporation tax
Norms – IOCs pay corporation tax  
    
    
  
45 





Appendix 4: SAFLII Data Terms of Use 
http://www.saflii.org/content/terms-use 
 
